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ABSTRACT' ■ 
A short verbal exchajig'e between a male and a female student,
 
ostensibly taped during an initial meeting at a campus com
 
puter dating service was the stimulus delivered to the 80
 
college women who served as subjects in this study. In the
 
initial phase of the experiment the number (2, 5), latency
 
(2 sec, 4 sec) and directibh Cpositive^ negative); of the
 
female students * attitude relevant responses were manipu
 
lated. Only direction of response had a significant effect
 
on the attitudes attributed to the female student. In phase
 
2 of the experiment, subjects were asked to listen to the
 
same tape again. Half were exposed to the same tape and half
 
to the same dialogue with the alternative response latency.
 
The results support the hypotheses that casual observers
 
attend to latency and direction of response in attributing
 
interpersonal attitudes•
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rNTRODUCTION
 
The specific jdcus of an experimental
 
investigation of the effects of varying the direction, fre
 
quency, and latency of an actor's evaluative interpersonal
 
responses/ On the strength of tlie attitudes attributed to
 
that actor. In broader focus, howeyef, the experimeht may be
 
seen as an attempt to fbrge some empirical links betweep
 
theories of attribution and general learning theory in an
 
area where both approaches have been applied. The goal of
 
this introductory section is first to review attribution
 
theory, especially the work done on the attribution of atti
 
tudes. This will be followed by a review of learning theory
 
based models of attitude acquisition and change. These feyiews
 
attempt to clarify the logic of the hypotheses tested in this
 
experiment.
 
Attribution Theory
 
Attribution theory grew from the study of person percep- ■ 
tion. Fundamentally, it deals with the social perceptions of 
ordinary people and the manner in which they organize and ex 
tract meaning from the social events occurring in their environ 
ments (Harris & Harvey, 1981). Fritz Herider, the acknowledged 
progenitor of attribution theories, is a gestalt psychologist. 
He and gestalt psychology have exerted a pervasive influence 
on research and theorizing in the area of attribution. Thus 
no review of attribution theory, however cursory, would be 
complete without some mention of gestalt psychology.
 
According to gestalt psychologists, a scientific
 
analysis of the objective characteristics of an entity will
 
not yield an understanding of how the entity will be per
 
ceived (Deutch and Krauss, 1965). A basic assumption of
 
gestalt psychology is that perception is fundamentally a
 
synthesizing and organizing process which is imposed by an
 
organism upon the stimuli which impinge upon its sensory
 
systems. Consequently, an objective analysis of a stimulus
 
field would fail to detect the organization routinely con
 
tributed by a perceiving organism. Another basic assumption
 
of the gestaltist is that perceptual organization is not
 
haphazard, but directed toward achieving some optimal state
 
of order and simplicity (Deutch & Krauss, 1965). Given these
 
two basic assumptions the task of gestalt psychology is to
 
delineate the mechanisms of perceptual organization and
 
specify the limits of their application. t
 
Two such mechanisms are "perceptual grouping" and "assim
 
ilation and contrast". Perceptual grouping is a mechanism
 
which allows the organization of a stimulus field on the
 
basis of a multiplicity of principles. These principles
 
include, common fate, similarity, proximity, common boundary,
 
good form, cause and effect, past experience and expectancy
 
(Deutch & Krauss, 1965). These principles allow the grouping
 
of stimuli into fewer categories than the original number of
 
stimuli and build in, among the categories established, sys­
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I tematiG,;S^etrical or balanced relationships. Analogous
 
i , processes have been postulated in the study of short term 
|| memory. The process of "chunking" (Miller, 1959) is directly 
I analogous to grouping; and the process of "Subjective brgani-­
■ ? zation" (Tulving, 1962y is analogous to supplying systematic ; 
I ; relatedness among categories. In either case, perception or 
I short term! memory> , fawer catedbries and vsystematic relatedness 
I among categories are postulated as fascilitating and econo­
. I , mizing cognitive work. 
|; The mechanism of assimilation and contrast involves 
I simultaneously maxiinizing and minimizing perceptual differ-
I ences, and accounts for perceptual differentiation and the 
f establishment of figure-ground relationships. 
I Essentially, the task Heider set for himself was to 
I transplant these notions from his gestalt psychology of per-
ii ception to the arena of social psychology. Heider's (1958) 
I first steps in this process were to suggest that attempting 
i; to understand social interactions, or simplify a field of 
social stimuli, generally involves grouping the stimulus 
i field into causes and effects; and further grouping causes 
j into personal and impersonal causes. This grouping, Heider 
suggested, is followed by a naive analysis of action. Heider 
termed the analysis "naive" because it is carried out by 
ordinary people with no formal training concerning the 
principles of scientific psychology. Nevertheless, Heider 
characterized the analysis as a relatively systematic and 
•4
 
rapid review of an actor's motivation, effort, and ability
 
in conjunction with a review of the environmental forces
 
favoring or opposing the action.
 
According to Heider (1958), a strong perceptual bias
 
operates during the organization of a field of social stimuli
 
which strongly favors the inference that something about the
 
actor(s) in the field caused action. The naive analysis of
 
action is a process through which adjustments for this bias
 
can be made. If the naive analysis ends in an attribution of
 
intention to a person, the cause of the action is economically
 
assumed to reside within that person. In short, the person
 
is assumed to have a personal disposition to act in the
 
manner observed. Much of the recent attribution research
 
has tended to equate "personal dispositions" with attitudes.
 
Heider's application of gestalt principles to social
 
psychology has several unique characteristics. For example,
 
his analysis emphasized the application of the mechanism of
 
perceptual grouping and he focussed on the perception of
 
social behavior rather than on social behavior itself. These
 
characteristics reduced the testability of his attribution
 
theory. That is, the functional mechanisms were phenom­
enological; causes and their perception were locked away
 
inside the minds of the actors and the observers. Consequently,
 
experimental manipulations which could test his theory were
 
difficult to devise.
 
The theory of correspondent inferences developed by Jones
 
and Davis (1965) was specifically intended to improve the
 
testability of Heider's theory of social psychology. It did
 
so by focussing analytical attention on the effects of an
 
actor's actions rather than on the observers perceptual
 
process.
 
It has been suggested (Cowan, Note 1) that Jones and
 
Davis (1965) took the gestalt out of attribution theory. It
 
is proposed here, however, that Jones and Davis merely
 
shifted from perceptual grouping as the mechanism of choice
 
in the organization of social perceptions to the mechanism
 
of assimilation and contrast. This shift is easy to charac
 
terize. According to the theory of correspondent inferences
 
the unique dispositional character of an actor can be in
 
ferred from the effects of an action, if that action has
 
effects not common to the available alternative actions.
 
For example, if an actor chose to own one of two identically
 
equipped automobiles, which only differed in that one was
 
yellow and the other red, the color could confidently be
 
inferred to be the criterion upon which the choice was made.
 
However, the more effects the action taken had that were not
 
common |to the available alternative actions (say the auto
 
mobiles' had different sized engines and different interiors,
 
as well as different color paint jobs) the less confidently
 
could a:causal inferrence be drawn about the actor's dis
 
position.
 
Just how informative such non-common effects will be
 
partially depends upon the social desireability of the effects.
 
Highly desirable non-conimon effects reveal only that the actor
 
behaved as others would have behaved- Thus choosing a new
 
Porche over an old Falcon, offered for the same price, re
 
veals little about an actor that could not have been guessed
 
before- the action was taken. However non-common effects low
 
in social desirability reveal something unique about the
 
actor. Choosing the old Falcon over the Porche suggest the
 
actor is unusual.
 
Jones (1978) has since suggested that the theory of
 
correspondent inference is actually a theory of information
 
gain. The inference that an actor's character is distinctive
 
in some regard is only Justified if some unexpected behavior
 
is revealed, either directly or indirectly. In this case,
 
an expectancy has been violated, and information has been
 
gained over and above that which could have been reliably
 
guessed correctly based on the expectancy. Jones goes on to
 
suggest that an expectancy may be category based or target
 
based. ; That is, an expectancy may be based on the behavior
 
of other actors who share some category membership with the
 
actor being observed. Or, the expectancy may be based on
 
past observations of the actor who is the attributional
 
target (Jones & Berglas, 1976).
 
In any event, the social perception process by assimi
 
lating,or contrasting it with the actions of other actors
 
or with the previous actions of the same actor.
 
  
 
 
 
This utilization of the assimilation and contrast
 
mechanksm in explaining the social perception process is
 
even mbre evident in Kelley's ANOVA model of attribution (Kelley,
 
1967).j According to Kelley, observers attribute causal signi­
■ ■ , 
ficancb for an action on the basis of an attribution data
 
table. Such a table is a three dimensioned conceptual cube
 
which Allows the observer to systematically vary the ground
 
■ 1 . , ■ • - ' ■ ■ ' ' ' ' - ■ 
against which the action in question is viewed. One dimen­
i ■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ ' 
sion allows"''the observer to contrast the actor against other
 
possible actors. Another dimension allows for contrasts among
 
entities, the recipients of the action. The third dimension
 
allows|for contrast among settings, or time and modality
 
features of the action. Kelley holds that the object of this
 
systematic review of an action is a search for consensus,
 
consistency, and distinctiveneSs. Consensus and consistency
 
are consistent with the concept of assimilation, while dis­
tinctiVenesS is analogous to the older gestalt concept, con
 
trast. I . .
 
Tbis emphasis on assimilation and contrast as the principle
 
mechanism through which meaning is extracted from a field of
 
social I stimuli has focussed interest oh contextuaT issues.
 
That is, a person's acts are always perceived within a context
 
of alternatives, or options, the nature of which should power
 
fully influence the attributions made to that person. Interest
 
in sucji contextual issues is very evident in research concerning
 
■ . ' ■ . ■/I- , ■ " ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■ ■ ' ■ • ■ ' . ■ \ ' . . . ■ ■ 
the attribution of attitudes. 
> I ■ , ■ . ■ ■ . . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ . . . ■ ■ : 
■ ' ■ I " ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■ ■; ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ; ■ 
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Attribution of Attitudes
 
Jones and Harris (1957) reported three experiments in
 
which they attempted to demonstrate the dependence of atti
 
tude attributions on contextual variables. In the first ex­
perimeht, the action observed by the subjects was an essay
 
i ■ ■ . ■ . ■ 
expressing either a favorable or an unfavorable attitude
 
toward I Castro's Cuba. Although this involved a direct
 
i
 
manipulation of the actor's behavior, the actor being the
 
essay Writer, it was conceptualized by Jones and Harris as
 
a manipulation of prior probability, or expectancy. The
 
other independent variable was choice. Either the essay
 
expressed a position that had been assigned to its writer or
 
a position that had been freely chosen by its writer. In
 
either case the writer was obstensibly a student.
 
The experiment had a 2 X 2 factorial design with two
 
levels;of prior probability (high, low) and two levels of
 
choice I (choice, no choice). In line with Correspondent Infer
 
ence Theory, Jones and Harris hypothesized that attitude
 
attributions would be correspondent (inferred directly from
 
behavior) only in the choice condition and only where the
 
expectancy was violated. In the no-choice condition the
 
essay would not be informative regarding the writer's atti
 
tude. This was so because an alternative non-common effect
 
of writing such an essay, in addition to self-expression,
 
would be to satisfy the demands of a teacher. Therefore, the
 
attributors would discount the evidence as not being indicative
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the actor's attitude and make attributions based on tbe
 
I initial expectancy or the highest prior probability.
 
The results failed to support Jones and Harris' predic-

I tions. Choice or no-choice, attitudes were attributed in line
 
ii with the opinions: expressed in the essays. In short, the
 
i| attributions were correspondent with behavior regardless of
 
i, context. This pattern of results was labeled, "the over-attri
 
bution effect."
 
ij The second experiment was a replication of the first but
 
I with many more subjects and eight additional control groups.
 
jj Three of these control groups manipulated the salience of the
 
1 no-choice:cbnstraintsi Prior to making attitudinal attri­
!| butions to the writer, the subject was required to write an
 
ij essay and not given a choice about which opinion to espouse.
 
1 Five other control conditions involved essays with balanced
 
■	 presentations of pro and con arguments.' Supposedly, these 
'	 essays had been written despite instructions to express only
 
if a pro or only a con position. The results of the replication
 
:: confirmed the results of the first experiment. Even in the
 
: highly salient no-choice context, the attitudes attributed
 
j	 were in line with the behavior observed. Only those individ­
uals in the no-choice condition whose essays were balanced
 
1! 	 or ambivalent were attributed attitudes contrary to the
 
assigned direction of their essays. This result was labeled,
 
"the foot dragging effect."
 
ij In experiment 3 there was a topic change to racial segre­
10 
gation and the mode of action changed from a classroom essay
 
to a tape recorded debate presentation. Prior probability
 
was manipulated by having the presentation delivered by a
 
Southern or Northern sounding gentleman. These individuals
 
either supported or opposed segregation, and did so, either
 
under conditions of choice or no-choice. As before, the
 
attitudes attributed to the actors fell in line with their
 
behavior regardless of the choice manipulation.
 
Over-attributipn, inadequabe discountihg, br what wpuld
 
ultimately become known as the "fundamental attribution error"
 
had been established as a reliable phenomenon.
 
Jones, Worchel, Goethkl and Grumet (1971) suggested that
 
there were two important weaknesses in the Jones and Harris
 
(1967) series of experiments. First, the manipulation of
 
expectancy was not experimenta1ly based. Rather, it was based
 
on a hunch about what the subject/observer would expect from
 
the actors. Second, the strength of the attitude revelant
 
behavior was not systematically varied. The variation that
 
did occur however suggested that it might account for signifi
 
cant amounts of attributional variance. To address these
 
weaknesses the Jones, et. al (1971) experiment varied expec
 
tancy by presenting information about the writer's attitudes
 
on other similar issues, and consistently presented him as
 
being very liberal or very conservative. The strengths of
 
the essays were varied at two levels, strong and weak.
 
Choice and direction of presentation were also varied. Thus,
 
  
the experiment had a2X2X2X2 factorial design with
 
two contextual Variables (choice and expectancy) and two
 
behavioral variables (direction and Strength of- essay).:
 
resultsIreaffirmed that the dine
 
had a significant effect upon attitude,attributibriSjeVen­
under the no-choice condition./ Howe:v^en;-the impact of the ;
 
essay's direction on the attributions inade was greater in :
 
the choice condition than in the no-choice condition. in ^
 
line with Jones and Harris' second experiment;
 
weak essayS^ under the no-choice conditions, lead to atti
 
tude attributions opposite the attitudes espoused in the
 
essay. For example, a weak pro-Castro essay presented in a
 
no-choice pro-Castro condition was taken as evidence of a
 
basically anti-Castro attitude. Again, this was referred to
 
as"The foot dragging effect." These experimental results
 
indicate that except where the behavioral cues are weak
 
attributors are much more sensitive to behavioral cues and
 
much less sensitive to contextual cues.
 
, In defense of the gestalt view Kelley (1971) and Lopes
 
(1972) both suggested that the essay paradigm is flawed because
 
the essays are actually written by experimenters father than
 
by legitimate actors being forced to espouse unfamiliar views.
 
Thus, the no-choice essays are perceived as too smooth, or 
I . too polished, to have been concocted by someone who honestly 
: held an opposing view. Kelley suggested that the over-attri 
bution effect might be accounted for by the presentation of
 
strong behavioral cues and relatively weak contextual cues.
 
TO test these possible art!factual explanations of the
 
over-attribution effect, Snyder and Jones (1974) report a
 
series of five experiments. The first experiment involved
 
essays which were either pro-Castro or pro-marijuana legali­
zatibn. Half the writers in each condition Were primed with
 
three plausible "pro" arguments which they Could use in their
 
essays. The other subjects were not so primed. Finally, the
 
essays written on each issues were cQ]_]_0Q.(-ed and distributed
 
among the subjects who had written essays on the other issue.
 
The two grpups of subjects were housed in separated rooms
 
during the experiment. Upon distribution, half of the essays
 
were presehted as having been primed and half as not having
 
been primed. This manipulatioh of perceived priming was crossed
 
with actual priming. Thus the experiment had a 2 X 2 X 2
 
factorial design, crossing issues, actual priming, and per
 
ceived priming.
 
Subjects in this experiment served as both actors and
 
observers. Furthermore, the subjects attitudes on the rele
 
vant issues were measured prior to and after writing their
 
essays. This measurement allowed Snyder and Jones to deter
 
mine if there was any systematic attitude change as a function
 
of writing the essays, and to determine more accurately the
 
extent of any over-attribution. That is, the attitude attri
 
buted to a writer minus the writers own attitude yielded a
 
more sensitive measure of over-attribution.
 
The results showed neither attitude change (in the direc­
13 
tion of the opinion espoused in the essay) nor any effects
 
due to actual or perceived priming. It did, however, clearly
 
demonstrate the over-attribution effect.
 
The second experiment repor-ted by Snyder and Jones was
 
essentially a replication of the first with a much larger
 
number of subjects (139 instead of 38). The results were the
 
same.
 
In the third experiment thd hypothesis advanced was that
 
the essay writers might actually be changing their attitudes
 
as a function of essay writing but might be reluctant to
 
change their response from the pre to the post attitude
 
measurement. In shbJ^t' it was hypothesized that the attri­
butors might be more accurate than the actors. To test this
 
possibility only half of the,subjects were asked to register
 
their attitudes prior to writing an essay. No significant
 
differences were detected between the post essay writing
 
attitudes of subjects who had, and subjects who had not,
 
committed themselves on a pre essay writing attitude measure.
 
The over-attribution effect however was clearly present..
 
Having attributoirs write essays under constraining
 
circumstances on one issue may not sensitize them to the
 
effects of those same constraints on essay writers dealing
 
with another issues. In the fourth experiment all subjects
 
wrote and read essays on the same side of the same issue
 
under the same constraints. Furthermore, all attributors were
 
aware that the essays they were reading were the product of
 
  
il. V::: ■;■■ ■ 'a- "V :; ■; ■X4:\; 
I X the same circ^imstanees under which they had written their own 
; essay. Although as actors these subjects did not attribute 
I any attitude change to themselves as a function of having 
II written their essays, as observers, they systematically 
attributed attitudes to actors in line with the g 
expressed in the essays. 
The final experiment reported by Snyder and Jones crossed 
three levels of constraint (choice, no-choice, forced priming) 
with two levels of essay direction (pro and con socialized 
medicine) . The priming cohdition differed from the one that 
had been used in earlier experiments in that subjects were 
forcefully directed to use the arguments with which they were 
primed. The results demonstrated that the attitudes attri 
buted to essay writers were most correspondent in the GhoiGe 
condition, and significantly correspondent in the no-choice 
condition but not significantly affected by essay direction 
in the forced priming condition. Snyder and Jones concluded 
that "...when behavior closely corresponds to detail con 
straints, their impact on the actor receives fuller recogni 
tion" (p. 596) . 
T^&n a.s a whole, the experimental evidence on the 
attribution of attitudes supports the conclusion that casual 
observers are very sensitive to behavioral cues. So much so, 
that unless the behaviora1 cues are weak or ambiguous, they 
exert a prepotent influence over the attribution process. 
Put somewhat differently, it appears that the casual observer. 
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Fritz Heider's "naive psychologist", displays a behavioristic
 
bias while inferring personal dispositions. Heider, in fact,
 
acknowledged this bias and characterized it as "behavior
 
engulfing the field" (Heider, 1944), Given these results
 
the question arises; Just how sophisticated are naive
 
psychologists? How thoroughly do they grasp the causal net
 
work relating attitudes to behavior? Can they intuit the
 
relationships between attitudes and behavior that have been
 
established in the laboratory? The experiment presented in
 
this paper attempts to address these questions.
 
Learning Theories of Attitude
 
Gordon Allport (1935) traced the use of the term attitude
 
in psychological literature to, its introduction in connection
 
with reaction time studies. An attitude, or a motor attitude
 
as it was originally termed, was an explanatory device
 
hypothesized to exist in order to account for the discovery
 
that reaction times were reliably shorter when subjects were
 
instructed to attend to the motor, rather than the perceptual,
 
aspect of a reaction time task.
 
Learning oriented theorists have attempted to accommodate
 
the attitude concept into their theories by emphasizing its
 
relationship to overt behavior. Doob (1947) conceived of
 
an attitude as "an implicit, drive-producing response con
 
sidered socially significant in the individuals society." (p. 136)
 
That is, Doob considered an attitude to be an implicit response
 
which could serve as an internal stimulus to which overt, as
 
well as cognitive responses, could be learftied. Construing
 
attitudes as responses implied that they could be influenced
 
by all the same variables and procedures that influence other
 
responses. Unfortunately, DbOb's;analysis of the nature of
 
an attitude wSs purely theoretical and leeked direct ex­
perimentaii.support. "i"
 
Staats and Staats ,(1957i w^ 	 first to provide
 
experimental support for a learning:theory of attitudes
 
There theoreticai formulations differed from Doob's in that
 
they held that attitudes, implicit mediating responses of
 
ah evaluative nature, were classically conditioned,
 
attitudinally relevant overt behaviors were operantly con
 
ditioned. Their experimental investigations demohstrated
 
that nonsense syllables, (OS analogs) which were initially
 
judged to be affectively neutral, would, in the manner of a
 
conditioned stimulus, take on the ability to elicit an
 
affective response (CR analog) via repeated pairings with
 
an affect eliciting word (UCS analog). Following Doob, the
 
Staats demonstrated that socially significant stimuli, such
 
■ 	as national names and common male names, could similarly be 
conditioned (Staats & Staats, 1958). 
Dealing more directly with interpersonal attitudes, Lott
 
and Lott and their associates demonstrated that real people
 
can serve as conditioned stimuli as well as visually, or
 
auditorily presented names. Lott & Lott (1960) reported an
 
experiment that involved small groups of grammar school
 
17 . ,
 
children. Sociometric procedures were used to insure that
 
the children brought together in those small groups were
 
relatively neutral toward each other in terms of their inter
 
personal affect. Then, in the presence of the other members
 
of his or her small group each child would play a game
 
structured by the experimenter. The child's performance
 
was then either rewarded or not rewarded. After the games
 
were concluded, liking among members of the small groups was
 
shown to be a function of the rew:ard versus, no reward manip
 
ulation. Children who had been rewarded in the presence of
 
a group of other- children liked the other children in their
 
group more than they had previously, and significantly more
 
so than those children who ha-d. not been rewarded.
 
Testing the applicability of learning theory one step
 
further Lott,>Aponte, Lott and McGinley (1969) had 32 first
 
grade children perform a task twice, each time in the presence
 
of a different adult. One adult rewarded each child immediately
 
after his or her performance, while the other adult rewarded
 
each child after a 10 second delay. The children subsequently
 
identified the adult who had rewarded them immediately as more
 
liked than the adult associated with the delay.
 
These and other findings encouraged the development of
 
more sophisticated learning models of interpersonal attitudes.
 
One such model is Byrne's Reinforcement Affect Model of
 
Attraction (Byrne, 1971). Research reports by Byrne and his
 
associates usually operationalize a reinforcing event as the
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discovery of an attitude similarity between a subject and a
 
real or experimentally implied, stranger. The reinforcing
 
effects of attitude similarity was established by Golightly
 
and Byrne (1964). They demonstrated on a simple discrimination
 
task, that presenting attitude statements with which a subject
 
agreed contingent upon correct response, and attitude state
 
ments with which a subject disagreed contingent upon incor
 
rect responses yielded significantly improved discriminative
 
responding.
 
Byrne sought to vary the strength or magnitude of the
 
reinforcers he used in his experiments but found that vary
 
ing the importance of the issue the attitude statement dealt with
 
was ineffective. Instead, Byrne and Rhamey (1965) found that
 
positive or negative evaluations of a personal attribute were
 
three times more potent as reinforcers and punishers than
 
statements revealing attitude similarity on impersonal topics.
 
This discovery lead Byrne and his associates to reformulate
 
the Law of Attraction. They suggested that attraction toward
 
a person is a positive linear function of the proportion of
 
weighted reinforcements received from that person. Although
 
the model proposed by Byrne Was elegant compared to other
 
learning theory based models of interpersonal attitudes it
 
only faintly reflected the intricacy of basic Learning Theory
 
as formulated by Hull, Spence and Miller.
 
Probably the most sophisticated learning theory adaption
 
of the attitude concept was proposed by Weiss (1968). Using an
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approach labeled "extension of liberalized S-R theory,"
 
(Miller, 1959), Weiss and his associates have persued the
 
study of attitudes and other social psychological phenomena
 
by systematically constructing analogies from social psychology
 
to variables in Hullian S-R theory.
 
All of the researchers discussed above used evaluative
 
rating scales as their standard tools for measuring attitudes.
 
Conceptualizing attitudes as prepared evaluative or affective
 
responses, however, suggested an alternative operationalization.
 
Weiss realized that a straight forward measure of the readi
 
ness of an affectively meaningful response is simply its laten
 
cy. By adopting such a measure of attitude strength Weiss
 
moved the study of attitudes from an ordinal to an interval
 
level of measurement which is closer to the original con
 
ceptualization of the term, attitude.
 
Weiss noted that the most common measures of response
 
strength in learning experiments are speed and resistance to
 
extinction for instrumental conditioning and speed and pro
 
bability of responding for classical conditioning. Although
 
Weiss was unable to find a suitable analogue for resistance
 
to extinction in his persuasive communication paradigm, he
 
found that relative frequency of agreement was an excellent
 
analogue to probability of responding, and that speed of
 
agreement was highly correlated with probability of agreement.
 
Drawing analogies between attitudes and responses, and per
 
suasive arguments and reinforcement, and using speed of agree­
  
 
 
 
 
 
I : , •20
 
ment as a dejpendent measure of attitude strength, Weiss and 
his associates were able to demonstrate a variety of relation 
ships. For example, (1) the strength of an attitude is a 
function of the number of times the attitude is paired with 
a persuasive communcation (Weiss, Chapula, Gorman, and Goodman, 
1981). (2) Attitude strength is greater for attitudes paired 
with strong rather than weak persuasive arguments (WeiSs, 
Rawson, & Pasamanick, 1963). (3) Attitude strength is a 
multiplicative function of argument strength and number of 
persuasion trials (Weiss, Chapula, Gorman, and Goodman, 1968). 
All of these relationships were predicted on the basis 
of analbgies drawn between social psychological variables and 
learning theory variables. Most importantly these studies 
demohstrate that the latency of an evaliiative response is ah 
indicator of the strength of the evaluation. 
In short, an actor can divulge the strength of his atti 
tude by the latency of his attitude relevant responses; the 
shorter the latency, the stronger the attitude and the longer 
: the latehcy, the weaker the attitude. 
■ Thus, the learning approach to the study of attitudesv 
j including interpersonal attitudes, has historically emphasized 
|i the relevance of classical conditioning, and to a lesser de­
{ gree the revelance of instrumental conditioning. Studies 
f conducted within this tradition have typically employed 
i independent variables such as number of conditioning trials, 
Ij strength of conditioning stimuli, and delay of reinforcement. 
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Given the sensitivity of the naive psychologist to
 
behavioral cues about an actor's attitudes, it seems possible,
 
if not probable, that naive psychologists utilize these cues
 
(frequency, latency) in making inferences about the strength
 
of an attitude. The hypotheses to be tested in the initial
 
phase of the experiment propose that upon observing an eval
 
uative interpersonal exchange subjects will:
 
1. 	attribute attitudes corresponding to response direction;
 
2. 	attribute stronger attitudes with higher frequencies of
 
similar evaluations;
 
3. 	attribute stronger attitudes to shorter latency responses;
 
4. 	attribute attitude strength as a multiplicative function
 
of response frequency and latency;
 
5. 	be more confident of attributions made when the actors
 
behavior violates expectancies in social desireability
 
(negative interpersonal evaluation) than when it is high
 
in social desireability (positive interpersonal evaluation)
 
These hypotheses assume that subjects will have some category
 
based expectancies about what the/average college student's
 
behavior would be like in the situation described in the
 
experiment. The behavior observed by the subjects will be
 
compared to these expectancies during the process of attri
 
buting attitudes. These expectancies may vary quite widely
 
among subjects and thus obscure the effect of the independent
 
variable manipulations, especially very subtle manipulations.
 
In a second experimental phase this source of error variance
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is reduced because subjects are provided with an explicit,
 
target based expectancy (developed in Phase 1) against which
 
to judge the actor's attitude. Thus two additional experi
 
mental hypotheses relevant to Phase 2 are;
 
6. 	shorter than expected latencies will lead to attributions
 
of stronger attitudes;
 
7. 	longer than expected latencies will lead to attributions
 
of weaker attitudes.
 
  
 
 
 
 
METHOD
 
Bhase 1
 
Ledts. Acting on the suspicion that females would
 
; be more sensitive to the interpersonal cues given by a fe^
 
|| male, 80 female subjects were recruited from undergraduate
 
i psychology Gpurses at California State Gollege, San Bernardino,
 
i One subjeot: was r per experimental session. Ten subjects
 
i were randomly assigned to each of the eight treatment con^
 
r:.-^ - -:'ditionS;.'V' 'V'- ^
 
; Design. Phase 1 of the experiment has a 2 X 2X2
 
j{ factorial design with two levels of direction of response
 
|i (positive, negative), two levels of number of responses (two,
 
1 five) and two levels of latency of responses (two seconds,
 
|j ■ four seconds)­
|| Apparatus. A cassette model (LXI) tape recorder was
 
used to present the prerecorded verbal material to the subject.
 
Both the experimenter and subject wore a pair of headphones
 
while the tape recorder was on.: For the subject, the head
 
phones reduced the possible influence of any external noise;
 
for the experimenter, the use of headphones facilitated the
 
correct operation of the procedure at critical points.
 
Procedure. Upon arriving at the experimental room, the
 
subject was seated at a desk equipped with a set of head­
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phones. The headphone cord was draped over a six foot high
 
partition to the right of the,desk. The partition obstructed
 
the subjects' view pf the sound reproducing equipment and
 
the experimenter during delivery; of the recorded stimuli.
 
Once the subjesct was seated, an introductory statement was
 
placed before her and she was invited to follow the state
 
ment as it was read to her by the experimenter.
 
The Statement read:
 
Your participation in this inquiry will,
 
involve listening to a tape recording
 
'lasting about 2 minutes. After you are
 
exposed to the taped material you wiTl
 
be asked several questions about the
 
impressions you formed from the tape.
 
The segment of conversation contained
 
on the tape was recorded at a campus
 
computer dating service.; The service,
 
while it operated, was offered to students
 
free in exchange for their cooperation
 
in a research project. The'students were
 
informed that the research concerned
 
interpersonal exchanges and the develop
 
ment of personal relationships.
 
The two people whose voices you will
 
hear were unacquainted prior to the
 
occurrence of the meeting at which
 
the recording was made. They were
 
furnished each other's names by the
 
dating service only 5 minutes prior to
 
their meeting. The only additional
 
information they had about each other
 
was that they had been selected by the
 
computer for the meeting. Whether or
 
not they would actually seek to date
 
each other was, of course, left entirely
 
up to them.
 
After the statement had been read and the subject indi
 
cated that she understood the nature of the stimulus to be
 
presented to her, she was asked to put on the headphones.
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The experimenter then took his position behind the partition.
 
A recording, one of 8 variations of the following dialogue,
 
was then played to the subject.
 
Introductory Bob: 

statements; Karen: 

Bob: 

Karen: 

Trial #1: Bob: 

Karen: 

Trial #2: Bob: 

Karen: 

Trial #3: Bob: 

Karen: 

Trial #4: Bob; 

Karen: 

Trial #5; Bob: 

Karen: 

Hi, you must be Karen.
 
Yes, I am. You must be Bob.
 
Yes, well its nice to meet
 
you. Is this your first
 
computer date?
 
Yes, is this your first
 
one, too?
 
Yes, and I'm a little nervous
 
about what your first im
 
pression is; give me a hint,
 
do you like my smile?
 
Yes, I do. It's ok./ Not
 
particularly but it's ok.
 
Ohi Well, do you like my
 
eyes?
 
Yes, I do. They're ok./
 
Not especially, they're ok.
 
How about my clothes, do
 
you like the way I'm dressed?
 
Yes, you look alright./
 
Not particularly, you look
 
alright.
 
Well, how about my hair; do
 
you like my hair?
 
Yes, it looks alright./ Not
 
especially; it looks alright.
 
Do you like my body?
 
Yes, I do. It's alright./
 
Not particularly; it's
 
alright.
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Closing 	Statement;
 
Bob; 	 Well, I don't know if I
 
feel any less nervous now
 
that I've gotten a hint,
 
but how about dinner to
 
night at the Castaways?
 
The presentation of the stimulus to the subject was
 
interrupted as Bob finished asking Karen out for a date and
 
before Karen had an opportunity to respond.
 
The items about which Bob questioned Karen were chosen
 
by listing twenty-five items upon which a male might be com
 
plimented and submitting the entire list to a group of 20
 
undergraduate women. They were asked to rate as high, medium,
 
or low, the reinforcement value of being complimented on
 
each item. The 5 items judged as having the greatest potency
 
as reinforcers were included in the dialogue.
 
The dialogue/was actually recorded live twice; once with
 
negative responses on all 5 trials> and once with positive
 
responses on all 5 trials. These 2 original tapes were then
 
duplicated, and the duplicates were edited and spliced so as
 
to create 8 distinGt tapes, representing the 8 cells of a
 
basic 2 X 2 X 2 design. Four tapes had positive responses
 
and 4 tapes had negative responses. Four tapes had 2 trials
 
and 4 tapes had all 5 trials. Four tapes had 2 second pauses
 
between Bob's questions and Karen's responses and 4 tapes had
 
4 second pauses between Bob's questions and Karen's responses.
 
After listening to the first recording, the subject was
 
asked to fill out a questionnaire (Appendix A). The order
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of the questionnaire items was counterbalanced across experi­
mental subjects.
 
While the subject,filled out the questionnaire at the
 
end of phase 1 the experimenter either rewound the tape, in
 
preparation for presenting the same recording again, or,
 
moved the tape fprward (the same distance as would hhve
 
been necessary for a complete rewind) in preparation for
 
presenting the same dialogue with the alternative response
 
; Once the questionnaire had been completed and collected, 
the experimenter indicated, "Now, I want you to listen to 
the tape again." 
Phase 2 ■;;; 
Phase 2 of the experiment has a 2 X 2 X 4 factorial ^ 
design with direction of response (positive, negative) number 
of responses (2, 5) and latency shift (short to short, short 
to long, long to long, long to short) as the independent 
variables. The subjects, apparatus, procedures and measures 
used during phase 2 were the same as those used in phase 1. 
Design. Phase 2 of the experiment was specifically 
designed to provide the subject/observer with a standard fpr 
comparison, regarding the actor's response latency. That is, 
it was assumed that the response latency exhibited by the 
actor during the first exposure would establish an expec 
tancy against which the latency displayed during the second 
exposure could be judged as long or short. During phase 2 
■ ■ ■-' „ ■ 28 
the forty subjects who had originally heard short latency 
responses were randomly assigned to hear either the same 
short latehcy responses again or the long latency response 
version of the same dialogue. Likewise, the forty subjects 
who had originally heard long latency responses were rahdomly 
assigned to hear either the same long latency responses 
again or the short latency response version of the same 
dialogue. 
Dependent measures 
Each subject attributed attitudes to the actors on a 
9-point likert scales which ranged from "extreme liking 
through "neutral" to "extreme dislike". The other modifiers 
used were slight, moderate, and strong. The scales were 
scored such that a score of one equalled the most negative 
attitude attribution possible, 5 a neutral attribution, and 
9 the most positive attitude attribution possible. Group 
comparisons were based on the mean attitude attributed to an 
actor by all the subjects exposed to a common condition. 
Likewise each subject gave their subjective estimate gf 
the probability tkat Karen would accept Bob's offer of a 
date. Estimates ranged from 0%, indicating absolute cer 
tainty that she would reject his offer, through 50%, indi 
cating both outcomes were equally probable, to 100%, indi 
cating absolute certainty that she would accept his offer. 
Comparisons among groups were based upon the mean proba 
bility of acceptance attributed to Karen. Finally, attri­
29 
butional confidence was assessed on a 5-point scale ranging
 
from no confidence to very strong confidence.
 
RESULTS AND PISCUSSION
 
Phase 1 ' ■ ^ 
As noted in the introduction, the specific focus of this
 
experiment was the effect of varying, the direction, frequency
 
and latency of an actor's evaluative interpersonal responses
 
on the attitudes attributed to that actor by outside obser
 
vers. Thus, in this particular experiment the focus was on
 
the attitudes ettributed to Karen, the actor most directly
 
expressing en attitude. The mean attitudes attributed to
 
Karen in the various conditions are presented in Table 1.
 
A factorial analysis of variance for those attitude attri
 
butions reveal only a significant effect for the direction
 
of Karen's responses (see Table 2). The attitudes attri
 
buted were significantly more positive in the positive re
 
sponse condition than in the hegative response condition.
 
Neither the number bf trials nor the latency of the responses
 
accounted for a significant proportion of the total variance.
 
The mean probabilities of data acceptance, assigned to
 
Karen in phase 1 are presented in Table 3. Again, an analysis
 
of the variance for these attributed probabilities detected
 
a significant effect only for the direction of response
 
manipulation (see Table 4). As hypothesized positive re
 
sponses lead to higher probabilities of date acceptance being
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:'TABLE.:1'>,
 
Mean Attributions- Regarding ttie Target Actor's
 
Attitude^ Toward the Object Actor in Phase 1
 
,'.Birectio.n
 
; Positive Negative
 
Trials;V t 2-ttials i S-trials. 2-trials 5-tria:rs 
Latency ■ . , 
short (2 sec) 4.2 4;8 3.8 4.0 
long (4 seG)f-: ^  f : 4.6^^^ / , : 4.7 4.0 3.8 
^ Higher values mean greater liking
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• ! TABLE 2
 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for r Attributions-

Regarding the Target Actor's Attitude
 
Toward the Object Actor in Phase 1
 
Source ,;V-;,;.vSS;:r;^:-v;:df : VMS' , .y v.-- -^" ,p 
^Direction (I 9.112 ; 6.634 : :.;oi2* 
Trials (T) ^ .vV.-vb:446-'' ^ .506 
Latency (L) '.' ■•112- '. - V, r082 V. ;V.7,76v; 
-D;; x t ■■ '1513v,V^ 'Vv-.'i446 ..506 
D X: L .113 113' ' '.vj. U .082 .;775 
T X L 1.013; >0T-.:0'r3':' : .737 ■ ■ ''>■393:;': 
: D X T X L .013 i>,i; V':,v,"v'v013-':" :y-; - - .^:.&09vvv- '■'.'3.324 
ROsidual 98.90 ' r;i::.374/. y 
: Total 110.49. ^ "v;'-7:9, 
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TABLE 3
 
Mean Probabilities of Data Acceptance Assigned
 
to the Attributional Target in Phase 1
 
Direction
 
Positive Negative
 
Trials 2-trials 5-trials 2-trials 5-trials
 
Latency
 
short (2sec) 0.488 0.508 .365 .447
 
long (4 sec) 0.610 0.542 .447 .391
 
 34 
TABLE 4 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Attributions 
Regarding the Target Actor's Probability 
of Date Acceptance in Phase 1 
lurce SS df MS F P 
Direction (D) 4477.5 1 4477.5 9.297 .003* 
Trials (T) 77.0 1 77.0 .166 .690 
Latency (L) 84.7 1 84.7 .176 .676 
D X T 8.3 1; 8.3 .017 .896 
D XL 10.9 1 . 10.9 .023 .881 
T X L 1332.5 1 1332.5 2.767 .101 
D X T X L 30.9 1 30.9 .064 .801 
Residual 34675.9 72 481.6 
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attributed to Karen. However, no other significant effects
 
were detected.
 
The correlation between the attitudes attributed to
 
Karen and the probabilities of date acceptance for phase 1
 
was highly significant (r = 0.353, df = 78, p < .001).
 
A t-test comparing the attributional confidence scores
 
for subjects exposed to positive versus negative response
 
tapes failed to detect any difference between the two condi
 
tions.
 
In siimmary, for phase 1, although the effect of direction
 
predicted in hypothesis 1 was supported by the results; direc
 
tion failed to interact in the predicted manner with the num
 
ber of trials or the response latency. Thus, hypotheses 2,
 
3, and 4 were not supported. The results also failed to
 
support hypothesis 5 concerning attributional confidence.
 
Phase 2
 
The data concerning attitudes attributed to Karen in phase
 
2 are summarized on Table 5. A source table for the corre
 
sponding 2 X 2 X 4 factorial analysis of variance is presented
 
in Table 6. The attitudes attributed to Karen after hearing
 
a "replay" of the tape revealed significant main effects for
 
direction of response and latency shift conditions. In addi
 
tion, the interaction of trials and latency shift unexpectedly
 
accounted for a significant amount of variance.
 
The effect of direction is again straight forward; the
 
attitudes attributed to Karen were more positive when her
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: ;M Actor's
 
Attitude Toward the Objiect Actor in Phase 2
 
^Direction,
 
y:, Positive Negative
 
Trials 2-trials 5-trials 2-trials 5-trials
 
' Latency Shift :v /, ' \ '
 
short-lohg, y 3 :4v4Q;^ ^ • 3.50 3.60
 
short-short 4.00 6.40 4.00 4.40
 
long-long 4.60 3.60 4.60 3.80
 
long-short - 5.60 5.6:0 4.00 4.20
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TABLE 6
 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Attributions
 
Regarding the Target Actor's Attitude
 
Toward the Object Actor in Phase 2
 
F P
 
Direction (D) 8.45 1 8.45 6.50 .013*
 
Trials (T) 1.80 1 1.80 1.38 .244
 
Latency shift (L) 10.70 3 3.57 2.74 .050*
 
D X T 2.45 1 2.45 1.89 .175
 
D X L 5.05 3 1.68 1.30 .284
 
T X L 13.30 4.43
 
lurse SS df MS
 
3 3.41 .023*
 
D X T X L 3.25 1.08
3 .83 .48
 
Residual 83.20 64 . 1.30
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responses were positive than when they were negative. The
 
significant interaction of latency shift with trials sug
 
gests that the pattern of differences among the means of the
 
latency shift conditions varies as a function of the 2 and 5
 
trials manipulation. Multiple comparisons among the four
 
latency shift conditions at the level of 2 trials failed to
 
detect any significant differences (see Table 7). However,
 
at the 5-trials level, the short-then-long condition produced
 
attributions of significantly less liking than the short-then­
short condition. Also, relative to the long-then-long con
 
dition the long-then-short condition produced attributions
 
of significantly more liking. These results are perfectly in
 
line with the predictions made by the positive response con
 
ditions and opposite the predictions for the negative response
 
conditions. Surprisingly, they are based on data that sum
 
over the positive and negative response conditions.
 
The planned comparisons for phase 2 were those between
 
corresponding expectancy fulfilling (short-then-short and long-

then-long) and expectancy violating (short-then-long and long­
then-short) latency shift conditons at each level of direction
 
(see Figure 1). Hypothesis 6 was supported in the positive
 
response condition. That is, shifting to a shorter response
 
latency lead to attributions of greater liking than did not
 
shifting latency (t = 2.11, df = 18, p <.05). Hypothesis 7
 
was marginally supported in the positive response condition;
 
shifting to a longer response latency leading to attributions
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TABLE 7
 
Multiple Comparisons Among Latency Shift Conditions
 
at the Two Levels of Trials Utilizing the
 
Least Significant Difference (LSD) Technique
 
2 Trials
 
latency shift Short-long Short-short Long-short Long-long
 
group means 3-70 4.00 4.50 4.60
 
LSD sub-groups* ' J
 
5 	Trials
 
latency shift long-long Short-long Long-short Short-Short
 
group means 3.70 4.00 4.90 5.40
 
LSD sub-groups* ^ —
 
* Groups sharing a common underline are not significantly
 
different at the = .05 level.
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6.0­
5.6­
5.2­
4.8­
4.4­
4.0­
3.6­
3.2­
4­
short- short- long- long­
short long long short
 
Latency Shift Condition
 
Figure 1. Attitudes attributed to target actor during
 
Phase 2 shown as a function of Latency shift condition for
 
both positive (P) and negative (N) response conditions.
 
  
of less liking than not shifting latency (t = 2.03, df = 11.2,
 
p = .068). Neither hypothesis was :s in the negative
 
response condition.
 
' G interaction between trials and;
 
latency shift repprted earll it seems advisable to inspect
 
(post hoc) the relationships among the four positive latency
 
shift conditions at the two levels of trials. These compari
 
sons revealed that the relationship between the correspond
 
ing expectancy fulfilling and expectancy violating latency
 
shift conditions were localized at the 5 trials level. Sub­
jects receiving the'short-thpn^iohg latency, compared to the
 
subjects receiving the short-then-short latency, attributed
 
to Karen less liking for Bob (t = 4.26, df = 8, p = .003).
 
On the other hand, subjects receiving the long-then-short,
 
compared to long-then-long, attribute, to Karen, more liking
 
for Bob (t = 2.36, df = 4, p = .06). The differences at the
 
2 trials level were in the expected directions but not signi- ,
 
ficant (see.Figure 2). 1
 
Again the attitudes attributed to Karen and the proba
 
bilities of date acceptance attributed to Karen in phase 2
 
were significantly correlated (r = 0.4978,jp< .05).
 
The significant effects detected in phase 2 clearly
 
reflect the pattern of results expected in the positive re
 
sponse conditions. Among the negative response conditions
 
nothing beyond chance variation was detected. One possible
 
explanation for the pattern of results obtained is that the
 
i 
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6.6­
6.4­
6.0­
5.6­
,5.2­
4.8­
4.4­
4.0­
3.6­
3.2­
short- short- long- long­
short long long short
 
Latency Shift Condition
 
Figure 2. Attitudes attributed to target actor during
 
Phase 2, in the positive response conditions, distinguishing
 
the 2- and 5- trials conditions.
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negative response manipulation was ambiguous. The taped
 
stimuli used in the experiment were constructed with the
 
intention of providing only a minimal positive or negative
 
direction in Karen's responses. This weak direction manip
 
ulation could then be strengthened by a shortened latency,
 
repeated presentation, or both. Apparently, while the, "Yes,
 
it's ok." type of response effectively conveyed a positive
 
evaluation, the, "Not particularly, it's alright." type of
 
response conveyed an equivocal, rather than negative, eval
 
uation. Strengthening such an equivocal response by shorten
 
ing its latency or by repeated presentation probably yielded
 
a response akin to a "definitive maybe."
 
The fact that the results in the positive two trials
 
condition of phase 2 were in the predicted direction but not
 
quite statistically significant, while the results in the
 
positive five trials condition were more clearly significant,
 
suggests that latency is indeed a subtle cue about an atti
 
tude's strength and may become salient only after repeated
 
observations.
 
General Discussion
 
In the studies concerning the attribution of attitudes
 
which were reviewed earlier choice, expectancy, direction,
 
and strength of action were manipulated as independent vari
 
ables. The attitudes attributed to the actors were found to
 
be first and foremost a function of the direction of the actors'
 
behavior. Essentially, the other variables served to modify
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the impact of the direction variable. In the present study
 
also, direction of behavior has a clear and reliable effect on
 
the attribution of interpersonal attitudes, as well as on the
 
assignment of probabilities for a specific attitude relevant
 
behavior. Indeed, the effect of direction is so robust that
 
it is clearly detected even when one of the two directional
 
manipulations failed.
 
Although choice and the category based expectancies
 
manipulated by Jones and his associates were not directly
 
manipulated in the present study, expectancy probably did
 
vary with direction. That is, in the situation described in
 
the experiment, positive and complimentary social interactions
 
were probably more expected than negative and non-complimentary
 
interactions. His covariation of expectancy with direction
 
was the foundation of hypothesis #5. Actions freely taken
 
which violate social expectations lead to very correspondent
 
inferences. As it turned out, the failure of the negative
 
direction manipulation left this hypothesis untested.
 
Strength of action was manipulated by Jones and his
 
associates as the proportion of statements favoring or oppos
 
ing a position. Multistatement presentations that were 100%
 
pro or con constituted the strong actions. Multistatement
 
presentations that were 50% pro and 50% con constituted the
 
weak actions. The contents of the weak pro and con presen
 
tations were nearly identical with the ordering of the state
 
ments being the principle distinction. In the weak pro pre
 
sentation the salience of the pro statements was enhanced by
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presenting them in the first and the last serial positions
 
with the actor finally stating support for the pro position.
 
In the weak con presentation the serial position effect
 
favored the salience of the con statements and the presenta
 
tion ended with an endorsement of the con position. Thus,
 
the strength manipulation in the present study was similar
 
to that utilized in the earlier studies only in that it
 
involved multiple actions, though not proportion of positive
 
or negative actions. The manipulation of latency as an
 
operationalization of strength appears to be unique to the
 
present study.
 
The results of phase 2 clearly indicate that in the posi
 
tive response conditions observers are sensitive to response
 
latencies and attribute attitude strength in the predicted
 
manner. What is not entirely clear from the results is
 
whether the observers' sensitivity to response latency is
 
dependent upon a violation of expectancy (a shift in response
 
latency) or simply upon repeated exposure to the stimulus
 
material. Comparisons between shifting and nonshifting la
 
tency shift conditions that begin with the same latency but
 
end with different latencies indicate that the change is im
 
portant. However comparisons between latency shift conditions
 
that end with the same latency, without regard to the initial
 
latency, suggest that only the second latency is attended to
 
by the observers. The fact that no latency effect was de
 
tected for phase 1, when there were no latency shifts, but
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latency effects were detected in phase 2, tends to support
 
the former interpretation rather than the latter. Still, the
 
possibility exists that simple repeated exposures without the
 
shifts in latency might have sensitized the observers to the
 
latency of the actor response. In any case, the results do
 
suggest that the naive psychologist has an intuitive grasp
 
of the relationship between attitude strength and response
 
latency. The fact that not one subject who had been exposed
 
to a real shift in response latency mentioned the timing of
 
behavior, when asked what they thought had been manipulated
 
in the study, attested to the intuitive nature of the attri
 
bution process.
 
In this particular experiment the focus was on the
 
attitudes attributed to Karen, an actor expressing an atti
 
tude. The focus of the paradigm however is the relationship
 
between the attribution process and the empirically estab
 
lished laws of learning and behavior. Thus, an alternative
 
focus for the experiment could have been the acquisition of
 
an attitude by the actor. Bob, who was being reinforced or
 
punished for interacting with Karen.
 
Data relevant to this alternative focus was collected.
 
That is, observers were asked to attribute attitudes to Bob
 
as well as to Karen. However, in order to justify a request
 
from the subject/observer for a prediction of Karen's probable
 
behavior it seemed advisable to have Bob ask Karen out. This
 
request by Bob constituted a powerful behavioral clue con­
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cerning his attitude toward Karen. As one would expect from
 
the literature reviewed earlier, this clue was prepotent and
 
probably overshadowed any of the more subtle effects of the
 
direction, trials, and latency variables.
 
The conversation between Bob and Karen could have been
 
scripted differently to avoid this problem. That is, the
 
tape could have concluded before Bob asked Karen out. As it
 
turned out the correlation between estimates of Karen's atti
 
tude and Karen's probability of date acceptance (behavior)
 
though significant hardly accounted for a quarter of the
 
variance among the behavioral predictions. Thus, the atti
 
tude attributions and behavioral predictions made by naive
 
psychologists reflect the much bemoaned lack of correspondence
 
between attitudes and behavior (Calder and Ross, 1973).
 
  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A
 
Sample Questionnaire
 
Please base your responses to the foilowing items on your
 
perceptions of the conversation between Bob and Karen. Take
 
your time and consider all of the alternative responses for
 
each item before you check the phrase which you feel is the
 
most appropriate.
 
1. 	a. Bob's attitude toward Karen is one of:
 
- extreme dislike
 
______ strong dislike
 
moderate dislike
 
' slight dislike
 
_____ neutrality
 
slight liking
 
moderate liking
 
^strong liking
 
. extreme liking
 
b. 	How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of
 
this estimate?
 
' very strong confidence
 
_____ strong confidence
 
: ' moderate confidence
 
_____ slight confidence
 
no 	confidence
 
a. 	Karen's attitude toward Bob is one of:
 
_____ extreme liking
 
_____ strong liking
 
moderate liking
 
•	 slight liking
 
neutrality
 
slight dislike
 
_____ moderate dislike
 
strong dislike
 
extreme dislike
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b. 	How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of
 
this estimate?
 
very strong confidence
 
- strong confidence
 
moderate confidence
 
slight confidence
 
no confidence
 
3. 	Estimate the probability that Karen accepts Bob's offer
 
of a date. Use any value from 0% (certain she declines)
 
through 50% (as likely to decline as accept) to 100%
 
(certain she accepts).
 
REFERENCE NOTE
 
1. Cowan, G. Personal communication, May 1982,
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